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1. Introduction 
The philosophical movement of naturalism is normally divided into two strands. One is a 
methodological one: roughly, that philosophy (or some area of philosophy) should proceed using the 
methods of the sciences, particularly the natural sciences. The other is a metaphysical one: roughly, that 
the theory of the world that results from our philosophical inquiries should match, or at least not 
conflict with, what the sciences tell us there is. This chapter focuses on the first strand of naturalism. 
What does investigation of metaethics and ethics look like if we take a naturalist approach? 
 
The focus of this chapter will be on methodological naturalism as an approach to metaethics. Part of 
metaethics, however, involves questions about the epistemology and method of ethics. These include 
questions about how we know what is morally right or wrong, good or bad, virtuous or vicious, etc., 
and what method we should use for determining answers to tricky questions about what we should do, 
how we should be, and what sort of world to aim for (morally speaking). Methodological naturalism 
about metaethical questions would typically go with methodological naturalism in the epistemology 
and method of ethics itself, though as we will see below one important strand of contemporary 
metaethical thinking treats metaethics as a naturalistic enquiry but does not treat ethics in this way. 
 
A wide range of methodological approaches are claimed to be naturalistic by their proponents. Perhaps 
this is not surprising—there are many ways an inquiry can be like scientific inquiry, and when there is a 
lot of disagreement in metaethics, there is likely to be a lot of disagreement even among self-styled 
naturalists. Rather than trying to determine who are the real naturalists, it is more useful to look at the 
different ways different metaethical theorists take the guiding idea of naturalism in different directions. 
 
Naturalism, of one sort or another, about the epistemology and method of ethical theorising is these 
days very widespread, but I think this state of affairs would have come as a great surprise to early 
analytic ethicists. In the first few decades of the twentieth century, one of the great divides in 
metaethics was between G.E. Moore and other non-naturalists, on the one hand, and the non-
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cognitivists such as Wittgenstein, Ayer and Stevenson. Despite their deep disagreements, each camp 
was convinced that ethics was not like science, either in its methods or results. 
 
Moore and other non-naturalists in his camp saw moral intuition as the core of ethical method though 
metaethics involved conceptual analysis as well: for example, Moore thought it was analytic that right 
action was a matter of maximising the good (Moore 1993 p 196). While it is somewhat controversial 
exactly how Moore saw moral intuition, it was clearly a very different process from scientific inquiry: 
intuitions were more like verdicts or seemings directly produced by reflection on scenarios, whether 
actual or imagined, than the results of theorising or observation. 
 
While use of our supposed faculty of intuition was in the first instance a method for determining ethical 
questions rather than metaethical ones, it is natural to see it as indirectly providing some of the 
materials for metaethical conclusions as well. For example, why should Moore think that subjectivism 
about ethics is false? In part because he intuits that the amount of moral goodness of an act of feeding 
the hungry does not depend very much, or perhaps at all, on who approves of it. Likewise for intuitions 
about a range of other scenarios where the difference between cases is only who judges things are good 
or bad, or who approves or disapproves. (Moore would have likely found this pattern even in scenarios 
where Moore himself has different attitudes. To adapt a case of Russell's, Moore would have likely 
intuited that the suffering in bull-fighting is bad even where, counterfactually, Moore himself approves 
of it.) A good explanation of this pattern (given intuitionist assumptions) is that the goodness of an 
outcome does not depend very much on who takes it to be good, or who approves of it, and so appears 
to count against subjectivism. 
Non-cognitivists, on the other hand, were equally convinced that ethics was not like science, but for 
quite different reasons. They rejected a non-naturalistic faculty of moral intuition, along with the idea 
that there were a special range of moral facts to be discovered. Instead, moral attitudes and moral 
disagreements involved something other than competing opinions about the facts: clashes of attitudes, 
perhaps, or conflicting imperatives. One illustration of the methodological anti-naturalism of non-
cognitivists is found in an influential paper by Charles Stevenson. Stevenson endorsed a strong form of 
naturalism about every factual question, but because, in his view, moral disagreements involved clashes 
in desires as well as beliefs, "scientific methods cannot be guaranteed the definite role in the so-called 
normative sciences that they may have in the natural sciences" (Stevenson 1963 p 8). The suggestion 
that ethics is not concerned with matters of fact, particularly the sort discoverable by the sciences, is an 
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even stronger motif in Wittgenstein's Lecture on Ethics: a complete scientific book of the world would 
"simply be facts, facts, and facts but no Ethics" (Wittgenstein 1965 p 7). 
As the twentieth century went on, the idea that good ethical and metaethical inquiry had little in 
common with the sciences was more widespread even than those who signed up to either Moorean non-
naturalism or the non-cognitivism of Ayer, Stevenson, Wittgenstein, etc. Traditional methods of ethical 
inquiry, both in metaethics and in first-order ethics, included at least three important components. The 
first was the use of philosophical and moral intuitions, direct seemings that perhaps required some 
experience to prepare an intuiter, but did not seem to require any scientific investigation to produce or 
evaluate. The second was the use of conceptual analysis, which seemed to involve nothing more than a 
priori reflection either on the meaning of what we say or the concepts we employ in ethical thought. 
Later in the twentieth century, a third method, the method of reflective equilibrium, became popular: 
this was seen largely as a matter of harmonising the moral principles we accept with the mass of 
individual moral judgements we accept, together with various other philosophical commitments we 
may have. (Reflective equilibrium was most famously presented by Rawls 1971.) This coherentist 
method, especially if the inputs were delivered by intuition or proposed conceptual analyses, again 
seemed very different from the methods of e.g. chemistry or demography. 
 
These methods were not just central to how first-order ethics was practiced, but in metaethical 
discussions as well. It is easy to find entire metaethical works with very little discussion of scientific 
questions, but plenty of arguments that look like appeals to conceptual analysis, ethical and metaethical 
intuitions, and attempts to harmonise clashing parts of our ethical and metaethical starting points. One 
influential example of this sort of work in metaethics is Michael Smith's The Moral Problem (1994), 
which on the face of it at least proceeds in a very different way from typical scientific investigations. 
 
There are some clear reasons naturalism about metaethical method is attractive, despite it having been 
far from orthodoxy at times in the past century. The sciences, particularly natural sciences like physics 
and biology, have discovered all sorts of facts that were not even dreamed of a hundred years ago. 
Furthermore, science is good at producing rational agreement: while there will always be scientific 
disputes, few seriously doubt e.g. that there is oxygen in the air or that antibiotics can cure bacterial 
infections. If we could turn these very successful methods to metaethical and ethical questions, we 
might hope for some of the same progress in discovery and in resolution of disagreements. Another 
reason to hope that naturalistic methods will be useful in metaethics is possessed by people who are 
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holists about inquiry. Answers we give in one area of inquiry often seem to have consequences in other 
areas of inquiry, and any particular piece of evidence we get can be handled by modifying different 
parts of our overall theory. If our picture of the world faces the tribunal of experience as a whole, as for 
example Quine would have it (Quine 1951 p 38), then it seems reasonable to think that our methods for 
going from our experience to our theories should have important similarities across subject matters. 
This suggests that our methods in metaethics and should not be too different from our methods in 
science. This line of thought will be particularly pressing for those who are naturalists about other parts 
of philosophical inquiry. So much of metaethics tackles questions about ethical language, or 
epistemology of ethics, or the metaphysics of ethics, or questions about moral judgements and moral 
reasoning that if we are naturalists about philosophy of language, epistemology, metaphysics, and 
philosophy of mind, naturalism about metaethics is virtually forced on us. 
 
A third reason may stem from metaphysical naturalism. If we became convinced e.g. that all 
phenomena in the world were ultimately physical, or that our nature was exhausted by biological and 
social features of us, we might come to expect that any ethical truths about our situation would also 
ultimately have a physical or biological or social basis. And if they do, that might suggest they are best 
investigated by inquiries like those we use for physical or biological or social facts. Of course, 
establishing this as a reason for methodological naturalism in ethics would require an argument that 
facts about us are ultimately physical, or biological, or social (or a combination): but arguments for 
physicalism and other forms of methodological naturalism are familiar from other areas of philosophy, 
including metaphysics, philosophy of science, and the philosophy of mind. 
 
Pursuing metaethics and ethics in a naturalistic spirit may be appealing: but how, exactly, ought we 
bring to bear the methods of the natural and social sciences? One way is through critique. Standard 
methods of ethics can be assessed for how naturalistic they are, and to the extent they are not a 
methodological naturalist may wish to modify, supplement, or even reject them. Another way is 
through developing positive naturalistic metaethical research projects employing scientific methods. 
Before discussing critiques and naturalistic projects, however, it will be worth doing some ground-
clearing, to see where methodological naturalism may go beyond uses of science that virtually 
everyone agrees are relevant to ethics, and distinguishing naturalism approaches to metaethics from 
naturalism about some other topics. 
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2. The Role of Science in Ethics: Preliminaries 
 
Everyone (or almost everyone) thinks that scientific methods are somewhat relevant to resolving ethical 
decisions. When deciding whether to administer a treatment to a patient, a doctor needs to take into 
account scientific evidence about what the likely outcomes of that treatment will be. When a 
government is contemplating a change in social welfare payments, one thing they should consider is the 
economic implications: what will this change do to inflation, employment, food availability to those 
affected, etc. Sometimes estimating these impacts will require specialised economic knowledge. When 
deciding what countries or individuals should do about climate change, the science of the impact of 
carbon dioxide on world weather patterns is relevant. And so on. What is at issue between the 
naturalists and others is whether, as well as these "descriptive" matters, there are "pure" moral 
principles concerning what we should do, and how we are to determine what those principles are. 
 
One might be suspicious that moral questions and “descriptive” questions can be divided up into 
entirely descriptive and purely moral claims. One way to separate out descriptive and moral questions 
is to use conditionals. For a given case, let the uncontroversially descriptive facts be represented by D, 
and some moral verdict be represented by M. Then the question of whether “if D, then M” is correct 
can be a matter of disagreement even for two people who both accept D (or both reject D, for that 
matter).  We can disagree about the conditional "if John took the car, (and such-and such else was 
descriptively the case), then he was wrong to take it", even if we agree on whether or not he took the 
car, for example.  (Or for that matter two people could agree with the conditional even if we disagreed 
about whether John took any cars.)  The conditional seems to capture a moral commitment that goes 
beyond descriptive commitments (or at least the specific commitment of D, at any rate). 
 
Specifying “purely” moral issues in this way avoids two tricky issues. One is whether “pure” moral 
claims can be captured by entirely general moral principles with no apparent non-moral commitments: 
one might doubt this can be done because of a general suspicion about moral principles of that 
generality. The other issue avoided is finding a way of once-and-for all drawing a line between moral 
and non-moral vocabulary. Many think that so called “thick” moral terms bring with them both moral 
and descriptive commitments: to describe a policy as cruel says something descriptive about the 
motives and potential for producing suffering of the policy, but also something moral about those who 
engage in it, for example. (See Sundell's chapter on thick concepts in this volume.) Some think these 
“thick” terms cannot be disentangled into those two components, at least in any language we have. If 
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we wish to isolate “pure” moral claims using the conditional strategy, we can often leave any allegedly 
thick moral expressions in the consequent, thus allowing us to state moral disagreements, including 
ones stated in thick terms, between people who agree on all of their descriptive commitments. 
 
Note that in dividing up claims into descriptive ones and moral ones, I do not mean to imply that the 
truth of moral claims is not fixed by the truth of the descriptive ones. Moral facts might even just be 
descriptive facts, for all that has been said here. (One simple example of a theory like this: one could be 
a hedonistic utilitarian that identifies the property of being the morally best outcome with the property 
of being the outcome having the greatest balance of pleasure over pain.) Nevertheless, even those who 
wish to identify facts specified with moral language and facts specified by non-moral language face 
controversy about whether, in settling a question posed in non-moral vocabulary, science goes very far 
towards settling questions posed in moral vocabulary, since the science of pleasure and pain is unlikely 
to itself tell us that hedonism is the correct moral theory. 
 
The next things to be careful about, when working out the role of science in ethics, is to keep in mind 
two distinctions. Let us first distinguish morality and mores: the difference between what is morally 
right or wrong, and what the conventions of a given society treat as morally right or wrong. Many 
people believe that what is right, on the one hand, and what a society currently treats as right, on the 
other, come apart. Some societies have had (and have) the death penalty for consensual sodomy: that 
by itself does not establish that consensual sodomy is sometimes in itself gravely wrong. Some 
societies have had (and do have) permissive attitudes towards slavery: that by itself does not show that 
slavery was morally permissible. Scientific discoveries about what a group’s mores are are only 
controversially of relevance to the question of what really is right or wrong. Even for those few who do 
who identify morality and social mores, the question of what justifies that identification, at least, is 
presumably not settled by discovering what the mores in fact are. 
 
The second distinction worth keeping in mind is the distinction between morality and altruism. The 
exact definition of altruism is contested, but at a first pass altruistic behaviour is behaviour that benefits 
others at a cost to oneself. Sometimes in the popular media discoveries about the “science of morality” 
only concern the science of altruism: how it developed, why evolutionary pressure does not eliminate 
altruistic dispositions and why they are sometimes maintained by evolutionary mechanisms, and so on. 
We should not assume too quickly, however, that discoveries about altruistic behaviour will be 
discoveries about morality. For one thing, some altruistic behaviour seems immoral: nepotism and 
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corruption are often engaged in to help relatives or friends, and the fanatic who slaughters innocents for 
The Cause might well be behaving altruistically even if what he does is horrendously evil. Even when 
altruistic acts are morally good, understanding and explaining their altruistic nature may not give us 
much insight into why they are morally good. 
 
So achievements in the anthropology or sociology of conventional standards, or the psychology or 
biology of altruism, do not seem to answer moral questions in any obvious way. It is tempting to think 
that we can gain some better answers to moral questions once we are sensitive to these discoveries, but 
getting those answers requires some further philosophical work. One valuable contribution naturalistic 
metaethics can make is to explain how and why we can draw conclusions about ethical and metaethical 
questions from evidence about the workings of mores and altruism. But we should not think that ethical 
and metaethical work is done just by investigating mores and altruism. 
 
3. Metaethical Naturalism: Two Examples 
 
There are many naturalistic projects, small and large, that are being carried out in metaethics. To get a 
sense of the range, let us look at two general approaches that stress methodological naturalism but 
which come to very different conclusions. The first is realist and cognitivist about ethical claims, the 
second anti-realist and expressivist. 
 
One influential approach to metaethics in the late twentieth century was pursued by a group of 
philosophers known as the Cornell realists, due to connections they had to the philosophy department at 
Cornell University. Major figures in this tradition included Richard Boyd (1988), David Brink (1989) 
and Nicholas Sturgeon (1988), while other philosophers like Peter Railton (1986) have metaethical 
views that resemble the Cornell realists in important ways. What unified the Cornell realists was the 
view that we could learn about moral language and moral metaphysics by looking at what scientific 
realist philosophers of science had to say about scientific language and metaphysics. Part of this 
involved the thought that we can judge theories using so-called “inference to the best explanation”. 
Something similar can be used in metaethics to choose between theories: and just as we can use 
scientific method to tell us about all sorts of physical and social phenomena, we can use similar 
methods to tell us about moral phenomena. 
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The best theory that enables us to predict and explain the spread of diseases, for example, is one that 
employs talk of bacteria and viruses in its predictions and explanations. When we test our theories of 
disease and they pass those tests, and our theory yields satisfying explanations of initially puzzling 
disease phenomena, that provides us with good reason to believe our theories of bacteria and viruses, or 
to believe those theories are approximately correct. Or at least that is a picture of inquiry, known as 
"inference to the best explanation" (IBE), which many scientific realists would accept. Cornell realists 
hold that we can apply something like this approach to investigating morality. Some packages of 
ethical and metaethical views do better in explaining the truth of our secure moral judgements, the 
behaviour of agents, and various other things. And we can test these explanations through further 
investigation, comparison with rival explanations, and in other ways. When we come upon a package 
that passes our tests and offers satisfying explanations of previously puzzling phenomena, we can use 
roughly the same method as we use in the sciences to infer, using inference to the best explanation, that 
we are onto the truth in our moral and metaethical theorising. (Or we are at least close to the truth.) 
Furthermore, just as the facts about viruses and bacteria are objective, and do not depend on what we 
happen to believe or desire about viruses, so to are the facts about morality objective, not depending on 
the theorist’s standpoint or preferences. 
 
The inputs, or "moral observations", that go into our ethical and metaethical theorising presuppose 
some willingness to categorise the world we encounter in moral terms: presumably an alien observer 
could detect all the same movements, masses, and even colours and sounds without necessarily 
recognising any actions as just or unjust, right or wrong. But this is not a barrier to treating moral 
observations as being like scientific observations, according to Cornell realists, since scientific 
observations presuppose theoretical commitments as well. An observer with no concepts of distances or 
planets can look through a telescope and see nothing but spots and regions of coloured lights, but this 
should not make us think that using telescopes to do astronomy is somehow unscientific. Indeed, for 
any experimental or observational science, we must make assumptions about the world to gather 
information from observation: we can test those assumptions piecemeal, but we cannot do without 
them altogether. Since this is the situation when it comes to any scientific observation, it is no worry in 
principle that it also obtains in the case of moral observations. 
 
Likewise with moral explanations. Someone who does not recognise that anything is right or wrong, 
good or bad, will not feel the need to explain anything they encounter in moral terms. But likewise, a 
hypothetical alien observer who can only detect living cells and chemical interactions might never feel 
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the need to offer psychological or economic explanations for phenomena that they observe, and this 
should not make us sceptical that there are minds or economies, or make us think that psychology or 
economics cannot be sciences. Cornell realists tend to go even further, and argue that there are 
explanations in moral terms of phenomena described in non-moral terms (Sturgeon 1988): the failure of 
a certain rescue mission, for example, can be explained on the basis that its leader is "no damned good" 
(p 243). If our best explanations, by scientific standards, of some phenomena described in non-moral 
terms turn out to be moral explanations, all the better for the Cornell realist story about confirming 
moral theories, and the metaethical package that goes along with those theories. 
 
The second form of naturalism we will look at in some detail takes a radically different approach to the 
subject-matter of ethics, but also in a way that permits us to see metaethical investigation as 
fundamentally like a scientific enterprise in many respects. This approach is the quasi-realist approach 
of figures like Simon Blackburn and Allan Gibbard. While Gibbard is more explicit about tying his 
approach to metaethics to an understanding of ourselves enriched by the social sciences, (especially in 
Gibbard 1990 and Gibbard 2003), other quasi-realists such as Blackburn (Blackburn 1993) do not 
present their work as having a particularly scientific methodology. 
 
In very rough outline, Blackburn and Gibbard see the central role for moral language as expressing 
certain attitudes other than belief: patterns of approval and disapproval for Blackburn, and plans for 
Gibbard (Gibbard 2003). However, despite this primarily expressive function of moral language, it 
behaves as if it states facts and makes claims to objective truth. After telling a story about how to 
express an attitude (or pattern of attitudes), a further story can be told about how to express a pattern of 
attitudes through calling various moral claims true or false, moral arguments valid or invalid, 
expressing claims about the connections between moral matters and non-moral matters (e.g. organised 
dogfights are wrong in part because of the unnecessary suffering of the dogs involved), and so on. 
Despite its core function as expressing attitudes other than belief, moral thought and language can 
come to have many of the features moral realists have claimed for it. (Arguably, Gibbard 2003 ends up 
slipping back into a kind of moral realism, though he would not describe the view that way.) 
 
What should expressivists say about moral method: how should we work out what to think about moral 
questions, and argue with others about them? Blackburn and Gibbard say a limited amount about this 
topic, but plausibly, this will be a matter of engaging with our own non-cognitive states, together with 
an evaluation of whether they would be different were we more ideal. Are any the product of false or 
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dubious factual beliefs? Are any produced by distorting processes that would be absent in more 
idealised versions of ourselves? Are their conflicts between our patterns of approvals or patterns of 
planning, and if so what is our attitude to how they should best be resolved? And so on. This internally 
focused project of self-improvement, together with related interpersonal exchanges aimed at this sort of 
thing and perhaps at exercising more-or-less respectful pressure on each other, seem like a radically 
different sort of 'inquiry' from scientific investigation of fully factual questions. (This seems to fit 
Gibbard's discussion of moral method in Gibbard 1990 p 253-337, and his explicit rejection of moral 
inquiry using just the methods of social science in Gibbard 2003 p 161.) So when it comes to making 
moral judgements, the method that seems to mesh best with quasi-realism is more like that proposed by 
traditional non-cognitivists such as Stevenson rather than those who want to assimilate moral inquiry to 
scientific inquiry. 
 
Despite this, when it comes to methods for resolving metaethical questions, quasi-realists are 
methodological naturalists. While moral questions are distinctively different from scientific ones, 
questions about what it is to make a moral judgement, or the function of moral language, or in general 
the psychologies of moral agents and the language used by moral communities are naturalistic 
questions. Indeed, one motivation for expressivism is a naturalistic conception of ourselves and our 
responses, and a desire to avoid postulating non-naturalistic moral facts, or non-natural facts about the 
nature of rationality. That motivation in the first instance comes from metaphysical naturalism rather 
than methodological naturalism, but it goes hand in hand with thinking that scientific means are the 
way to improve our theories of human agents and their interactions. Quasi-realists should think, and do 
think, that psychology and linguistics will reveal what mental states we have and how we express them 
in language. Philosophers of language and mind and those who work on metaethics and moral 
psychology have contributions to make here too, but as part of an integrated project of understanding 
ourselves as natural creatures in natural environments, rather than seeking a special philosophical realm 
of objective facts about morality or rationality. Ethics does not look much like science from a quasi-
realist perspective, but metaethics does. In treating meta-ethics naturalistically despite not taking a 
naturalistic approach to ethical questions, quasi-realists resemble some earlier non-cognitivists such as 
Stevenson 1963, though I would hesitate to classify some other traditional non-cognitivists, such as 
Wittgenstein, as meta-ethical naturalists. 
 
4. Naturalism and Traditional Methods of Metaethical Inquiry 
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Naturalism in ethics can seem like a radical doctrine, especially against the background of insistence by 
people like Moore and Wittgenstein that ethics cannot be science. So you might have thought, and 
some naturalists do think, that methodological naturalism precludes relying on the methods 
traditionally used by analytic philosophers to answer metaethical and ethical questions. However, some 
self-identified naturalists have tried to vindicate the use of moral intuitions, reflective equilibrium, and 
even conceptual analysis as important parts of ethical inquiry. This section will look at some attempts 
to reconcile these methods with naturalism. 
 
Debates in moral philosophy frequently feature appeals to “intuition”, and some theories of the source 
of moral intuitions make using intuitions radically different from engaging in scientific method. G.E. 
Moore’s theory of moral intuition, for example, maintained that moral intuition was a distinct 
psychological faculty, that gave us access to a special kind of property, even when contemplating non-
actual scenarios. Some theories of this sort of intuition take it to be a special rational faculty that 
delivers us information about the world: see Bealer 1998 for a defence of this view of philosophical 
intuitions in general. Metaethical positions are also often justified by appeal to “intuition”: it is 
supposed to be our intuitions about the subject matter that support the doctrine that moral facts are 
objective, for example. Understandably, naturalists have often wanted to reject the psychological 
picture on which we have this sort of special faculty, or other distinctive moral detectors such as a 
“moral sense”. 
 
However, there are other theories of intuitions and appeals to intuitions that make them seem less anti-
naturalistic. Perhaps intuitions are just our judgements about cases: David Lewis claims about 
philosophical intuitions that "[o]ur intuitions are simply opinions" (Lewis 1983 p x). Or perhaps they 
are a special class of judgements, such as the relatively unreflective ones or the ones not arrived at by 
explicit inference from other judgements. Or perhaps they are inclinations to make such judgements. 
Seen in these ways, starting from our moral intuitions may be no more mysterious than starting from 
our ordinary opinions in any other inquiry. Historically, this seems to have been where many successful 
scientific inquiries came from: even physics and chemistry have their origins in plausible speculations 
about motion and the interactions of matter. Even today, many mature scientific inquiries still employ 
elements of good sense, hunches, and other moves that look like they are supported by something like 
educated "intuition". It would make no sense for a methodological naturalist to demand that ethical and 
metaethical theorising have no place for intuition if intuitions can be found playing a helpful role even 
in paradigm scientific enterprises. 
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The method of reflective equilibrium, very roughly, is the method of beginning by articulating 
particular moral judgements and pre-theoretic moral generalisations, perhaps supplementing both of 
these with moral intuitions, and then bringing the resulting theory into “equilibrium” by working out 
the strengths of the various judgements and in cases of clashes, modifying those held less strongly so as 
to cohere with the more certain ones. As mentioned above, this procedure can seem suspicious to 
naturalists: it does not seem to be constrained by what the world is like, as opposed to what we are 
inclined to believe about the world. It suggests that ethics is constructed, rather than discovered, which 
seems a stark contrast from scientific inquiry. Indeed, Rawls himself seems to have favoured a 
constructivist approach to ethical truth. Finally, the starting point of reflective equilibrium involves 
giving a central role to intuitions, so suspicion of intuitions naturally carry over to suspicion of 
reflective equilibrium. 
 
However, it is far from obvious that there is anything naturalistically objectionable about using 
reflective equilibrium. Historically, Rawls’s conception of reflective equilibrium derives from 
Goodman’s 1955 account of how we should establish the correct theory of inductive inference. 
Goodman’s project was, in part, giving a theory of good scientific method: and so trying to do the same 
thing for ethics looks like a methodologically naturalist move, not an anti-naturalist one. Those 
sympathetic to Goodman, at least, are likely to see scientific inquiry itself as engaging in something 
like reflective equilibrium, trading off views about the soundness of particular judgements about the 
world and principles of unifying and revising those particular judgements. So it is not clear that 
employing reflective equilibrium is somehow unscientific.  
 
When evaluating how naturalistic reflective equilibrium is, it can matter whether we conceive of 
reflective equilibrium in a narrow or a wide way. (For the distinction see Daniels 1979.) Narrow 
reflective equilibrium looks only at one's own particular and general moral judgements, and trades 
them off to reach a stable equilibrium. Wide reflective equilibrium takes into account many more 
considerations when trying to reach a stable resting place, including what judgements others are likely 
to make, different conjectures that could explain the judgements of oneself and others, and beliefs other 
than moral beliefs, e.g. beliefs about how it is reasonable to criticise initial judgements, beliefs about 
human psychology and sociology, and so on. At its widest, reflective equilibrium could be performed 
on all our beliefs at once. A wide enough reflective equilibrium can take into account anything a 
naturalist might want to bring to bear on moral inquiry, so whether a particular project of reflective 
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equilibrium is objectionable on naturalist grounds is likely to have more to do with how narrow it is 
than that it involves reflective equilibrium per se. 
 
Using conceptual analysis to reach metaethical conclusions is widespread, and seems to often be what 
is going on when philosophers offer an "analysis" of justice, or supererogation, or moral goodness in 
terms of reasons, etc. Conceptual analysis is often thought to be anti-naturalist, both because the results 
of conceptual analysis are meant to be a priori (and many methodological naturalists are suspicious of 
the a priori), and because resolving a question through conceptual analysis seems to be a method that 
insulates that inquiry from what science has to tell us, and from scientific testing of that answer. These 
suspicions of conceptual analysis are not particularly to do with conceptual analysis as used in ethics: 
many naturalists are suspicious of conceptual analysis across the board. See e.g. Devitt 1996 or 
Kornblith 2002. 
 
However, a number of theorists have wanted to defend conceptual analysis as naturalistically 
respectable. Just two examples are the accounts of conceptual analysis offered by Rey 1998 and 
Jenkins 2008, 2013. While these accounts have many psychological and epistemological differences, a 
shared idea is that what concepts we have and what those concepts represent about the world is a matter 
of past engagement with the world itself: and once we think of concepts as mental representations 
bearing reliable information about the external world, a connection produced by ordinary causal 
interactions, it does not sound particularly anti-naturalistic to think that conceptual analysis is in part a 
process of making that information available for belief. If conceptual analysis is widely used, at least 
implicitly, in the sciences, that would make it even more naturalistically acceptable. For example, if 
Jenkins 2008 is right that conceptual analysis, as she conceives of it, is the source of our basic 
arithmetical knowledge, the results of conceptual analysis sit at the core of most contemporary natural 
and social sciences: neither would get very far without numbers. 
 
One strand of recent metaethical theorising that would describe itself as naturalist, despite relying 
heavily on conceptual analysis, is the moral functionalism defended by Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit 
(see Jackson and Pettit 1995, Jackson 1998). The core of metaethical inquiry, according to this view, 
consists of two steps. The first is to assemble “commonplaces” about ethics, particularly 
generalisations about ethical matters that we could reasonably think are shared among those who use 
ethical concepts and are at least implicit, if not explicit, in their use of moral expressions. Once we 
have our commonplaces assembled, we can treat them as implicitly defining the subject matter of our 
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inquiry. This network can be treated as implicitly defining many pieces of moral vocabulary together. 
For example, if we define just actions partly in terms of which distributions of resources are morally 
good, for example, then information we have about what are paradigm examples of just actions are 
might help constrain what counts, in our "folk" theory of morality, as being a morally good outcome. 
 
Armed with our networked implicit definition of moral vocabulary, the second step is to examine the 
world to determine what properties and objects best satisfy that network definition of our moral terms. 
Jackson and Pettit 1995, for example, suggest that the right actions are the ones we would approve of 
under various (descriptively specified) improvements to our situation. Jackson 1998, on the other hand, 
suggests that the property of goodness, as implicitly defined, might end up being maximising desire 
satisfaction. The question of what sequence of properties fits the networked implicit definition supplied 
by moral commonplaces, however, is in principle a matter for scientific inquiry, particularly social and 
psychological scientific inquiry. 
 
The theory that results from the moral functionalist procedure is intended to be metaphysically 
naturalistic, or “descriptivist”, since the aim of the moral functionalist is to determine what it is in the 
world, specified in non-moral vocabulary, which plays the functional roles specified for moral 
properties like goodness and obligatory action and justice. But it is natural to see it is as 
methodologically naturalistic as well—or at least intended to be by its proponents. The first step of the 
project is one they think is needed in a wide variety of areas to fix the subject matter of an inquiry: 
indeed, they model their strategy on that of the analytic functionalists in the philosophy of mind, who 
think that this kind of approach will provide the foundations for cognitive psychology, by offering us a 
way of understanding what e.g. beliefs and desires are. And the second step, locating the things that 
best play those roles in the world that science tells us about, looks like a fairly standard scientific 
inquiry. Despite the heavy reliance on conceptual analysis in the first step of establishing the networked 
interdefinition of moral vocabulary, the moral functionalist approach is intended to be part of a 
methodologically naturalistic approach to metaethics. 
 
This section has attempted to establish, not that naturalists must by sympathetic to methods such as 
reliance on intuitions, use of reflective equilibrium, and use of conceptual analysis, but rather that being 
a naturalist about moral methodology does not per se mean that a theorist must reject any of these three 
tools for moral inquiry. Methodological naturalism need not be a revolutionary doctrine when it comes 
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to the question of how to do moral inquiry. 
 
However, those who retain any of these methods but who wish to be methodological naturalists may 
want to treat them in particular ways. It would be natural to not just rely on intuitions in metaethics, 
especially if intuitions are something like trained hunches or what seems plausible before detailed 
inquiry. Methodological naturalists are likely to think that conceptual analysis cannot be the full story 
about the metaphysics and epistemology of morality or the key to moral psychology: all of these areas 
seem to have substantive questions in them to be resolved by theoretical inquiry and not just reflection 
on concepts. Finally, insofar as reflective equilibrium plays a role, it is more plausible that information 
about ourselves and the world other than just the particular judgements and principles we begin with 
should be the inputs into our theoretical trade-offs. 
 
Methodological naturalism in metaethics offers more than a new take on traditional methods, however. 
Bringing scientific methods to bear on metaethical questions gives us more options than just pursuing 
metaethical business-as-usual. Let us turn to examine some of these new options. 
 
5. New Uses for Science in Metaethics 
 
Perhaps naturalists can keep some or all of the traditional methods of ethics, and approaches to 
metaethics, employed in analytic philosophy. But naturalism can make a distinctive contribution if 
there are new, promising, methods available through applying scientific techniques to address ethical 
and metaethical questions. 
 
We have already seen one suggested above in the discussion of Cornell realism. It is that we can use 
inference to the best explanation (IBE) to reach ethical conclusions. Cornell realists talk less about the 
justification for their approach to metaethics, but it is natural to see this as a matter of applying IBE as 
well. Note that the general kind of project pursued by the Cornell realists could be pursued by 
naturalists who disagree with particular views the Cornell realists may have had about science, 
language, or ethics: just as rival scientific theories can appeal to the same canons of scientific method, 
rival metaethical approaches can share a view about what it would take to vindicate one approach over 
the other. 
 
A second use of the methods of the sciences, particularly the social sciences, can be found in the 
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contemporary "experimental philosophy" or "xphi" movement. Narrowly construed, this movement 
seeks to discover what non-philosopher's judgements are about topics of philosophical interest, for 
example to test whether "intuitions" philosophers rely upon are widespread in the general public, and to 
do so through empirical surveys. Why would the results be valuable for metaethics? If intuitions or the 
results of conceptual analysis were legitimate inputs to metaethical theorising, then drawing intuitions 
from a broader range of informants and observing how they deploy concepts that they are 
presumptively competent with could provide better data for those inputs. On the other hand, if there is 
no particular reason to trust intuitive judgements or information apparently drawn from concepts, it is 
less clear why the judgements of the person on the street are relevant. Experimental philosophy might 
still be able to serve a debunking function if it turned out that philosophers' intuitions were not widely 
shared beyond the ivory tower, for example. But its role in positive theorising about the nature of 
ethical facts, the epistemology of moral judgement, their objectivity etc. would likely be limited. 
 
Despite its name, "experimental philosophy", in the most common use of that term, covers a 
comparatively narrow range of experimental work being drawn on by contemporary philosophers. 
Another major source of evidence is coming from psychological investigations into how we make 
moral judgements. Some of that work takes the form of asking informants for their moral judgements 
and theorising about what best explains those patterns (i.e. xphi in the more narrow sense). But 
psychologists can take advantage of more sources of evidence than that. To give one example, one 
debate with metaethical relevance is the debate about how much moral behaviour is influenced by 
relatively transitory features of an environment that an agent finds herself in. This debate, about 
situationism, seems to have implications for whether there are moral virtues, or at least whether moral 
virtues can play the kind of central role that virtue ethicists have traditionally thought: if it is an illusion 
that there are kind people and cruel people, as opposed to people acting kindly or cruelly because of 
local situational factors, then a virtue ethics that builds an account of moral behaviour around virtues 
such as kindness and vices such as cruelty would be refuted.  
 
The experimental evidence assembled about situationism is typically drawn from putting experimental 
subjects in a variety of conditions and seeing what they do. A famous early experiment in this area is 
the notorious experiment carried out by Stanley Milgram, where experimental subjects would 
administer what they thought were severe, and potentially fatal, electric shocks to other people as 
punishment for mistakes in a test, merely because the experimenter told them sternly to do so. These 
punishments continued despite the screams and pleas of those apparently affected by those shocks 
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(Milgram 1974). More recent experiments have demonstrated significant differences in moral 
behaviour based on relatively small differences in circumstances: for example, the likelihood someone 
will stop to help an apparently injured man who has dropped some books is radically decreased if there 
is loud ambient noise, such as a mower running nearby (Mathews and Canon 1975). The cumulative 
effect of these sorts of experiments leads Doris 2002 to argue that the psychological presuppositions of 
traditional virtue ethics must be rejected. 
 
Of course, experimental evidence on its own does not settle the issue of whether traditional virtue 
ethics has been refuted, and Doris is sensitive to the need do serious theoretical work to show that these 
experiments bear on the viability of virtue ethics (Doris 1998). There are still debates to be had about 
the connection between evidence about people's behaviour in morally charged situations and what 
conclusions we can draw about whether there is moral character, and if so what it is like. Doris and 
Stitch 2014 have a good introductory discussion of the back-and-forth about situationism and virtue 
ethics, as well as a discussion of many other places where psychological results (including more 
narrowly x-phi ones) play into metaethical debates. Whatever conclusions should be drawn in the end 
about situationism and virtue theory, it is clear that psychological experiments other than surveys have 
a role to play in metaethical debates, as well as xphi narrowly conceived. 
 
There is no reason why psychological research is the only place where metaethicists should find useful 
scientific resources, either. Investigation of the evolution of human behaviour, and how it is influenced 
by genetics and transmitted culture are others. Both economics and political science have, in their own 
ways, always been close cousins of ethical inquiry, and the project of working out what sort of thing 
moral agents are and how they best interact is naturally one that disciplines such as anthropology and 
sociology can also contribute to. There is often careful theoretical work to be done to show how 
scientific results bear on traditional metaethical questions. But in this respect metaethics need be no 
different from science either: the links between results of experiment and general theoretical questions 
often require careful work to make out, despite the mythology of entire theories being immediately 




This introduction could not hope to be comprehensive: many ethicists see themselves as naturalists to a 
greater or lesser extent, and the temptation to conduct metaethical and ethical inquiry along scientific 
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lines is perennial. Given the disputes between card-carrying naturalists, it is unlikely that a commitment 
to methodological naturalism all by itself can determine very much about how to carry out moral 
inquiry. My own view is that it is very unlikely that naturalism could provide a shortcut that is some 
kind of alternative to the careful inquiry and deliberation that making progress on moral issues requires. 
However, construing moral method in naturalistic terms does shift the focus of some methodological 
debates, and it can direct attention to avenues of inquiry too often neglected by traditional moral 
philosophy. Whatever turns out to be the truth of the matter about the methodological similarities 
between moral inquiry and scientific inquiry, or between metaethical inquiry and scientific inquiry, the 
debate between naturalists and non-naturalists, and among different naturalists, promises to both 
improve our understanding of moral inquiry and improve our methods for that inquiry.1 
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